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TOURO LAWREVIEW
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. Taylor'
(decided December 23, 2003)
Davon Taylor was convicted in the Supreme Court of New
York for the intentional second-degree murder of an enemy drug
dealer.2  Taylor appealed his conviction, claiming denial of
effective assistance of counsel based on his attorney's failure to
object to various questions asked of his sole alibi witness.'
Additionally, Taylor claimed that parts of the prosecutor's
summation affected the outcome of the case.4 The Appellate
Division, First Department, affirmed his conviction,' finding that
effective assistance of counsel was provided in accordance with
the Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution 6 and Article I,
section 6 of the New York State Constitution.'
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that
Taylor did not meet the burden necessary to prevail on a claim of
' 2003 N.Y. LEXIS 4214 (N.Y. Dec. 23, 2003).2 1d. at *.
3 Id. at *2.
41d.
5 1d.
6 U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in pertinen' part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the Assisance of Counsel for his
defence."
7 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 provides in pertinent part: "'In any trial in any court
whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and
with counsel. .. "
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ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
ineffective assistance of counsel.' The court reiterated that a
defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show the
absence of strategies or trial tactics which would explain the
failures of counsel.9 The defendant must also show that there was
no defense strategy or other "legitimate explanation" for counsel's
actions and within the circumstances of the particular case the
defendant was without meaningful representation.'°
Taylor's claim of ineffectiveness of counsel was based on
two distinct claims. First, defense counsel failed to object to
questioning of the alibi witness, the mother of Taylor's child, and
failed to adequately discredit the prosecution's witness's
statements against him which affected the outcome of the case."
Second, Taylor claimed that the attorney's failure to object to a
statement in the prosecutor's summation, that the sole alibi witness
was "bought and paid for," impliedly indicated to the jury that the
witness was testifying because she was receiving financial support
from the defendant. 2 Taylor contended that this statement
discredited his sole witness. 3 Upon examination of the record, the
court found that defense counsel may have ceased her numerous
objections on the legitimate belief that too many objections would
result in alienation of the jury and annoyance of the court.'4 With
' Taylor, 2003 N.Y. LEXIS 4214, at *6.
9 Id
1° Id
" Id. at *2, *4.
I2 Id. at *3 n.1.
"3 Taylor, 2003 N.Y. LEXIS 4214, at *3.
14 Id. at *5.
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respect to the second claim, the court found that the record did not
indicate that the statement made about the witness affected defense
counsel's performance, and that it was an "unfortunate" choice of
words. 5 The court found sufficient evidence of defense counsel's
active participation in all aspects of the trial, and her actions
presented a "coherent, cogent defense."' 6  Further, the court
reasoned that "[a]n attorney who presents a well-grounded but
unsuccessful defense will not later be held to have provided
ineffective assistance of counsel, and thus a defendant will not be
entitled to a vacatur of his conviction on such basis."'7
The court based its holding on the requirement that to prove
an ineffectiveness claim, the conduct of counsel must be proven
unreasonable in light of all circumstances of the trial and
objectively unrelated to a legitimate strategy to succeed. 8 The
court found that Taylor's defense counsel may have had a
reasonable strategy in mind when ceasing her objections, and her
professional judgment allows her to reasonably rely on the strategy
that the prosecution would alienate the jury by making
objectionable remarks in his summation. 9 For these reasons,
Taylor was unable to meet his burden, and the court held that he
was not denied effective assistance of counsel.
Ild. at *3 n.1.
16 Id at *4.
'Id. at *4-*5 (citing People v. Baldi, 429 N.E.2d 400, 401 (N.Y. 1981)).
18 Taylor, 2003 N.Y. LEXIS 4214, at *5.
'9 Id. at *5-*6.
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In Strickland v. Washington,"0 the United States Supreme
Court held that a defendant will be deemed to have received
effective counsel under the Sixth Amendment when defense
counsel's conduct is within a professionally reasonable range of
judgment.2  The Court held that a presumption of adequate
performance is applicable because it has become too easy to
review defense counsel's conduct in hindsight and find it
unreasonable.22 The factors relevant to the Court's decision
included whether the conduct of counsel was deficient so that the
defendant was actually denied "counsel" and that the deficiency
prejudiced the defense. 3
The defendant in Strickland claimed that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel.24  He based his argument on six
claims: his attorney's failure to move for a continuance before
sentencing, to seek a pre-sentence investigation report, to present
meaningful arguments at the sentencing hearing, to investigate the
medical evidence thoroughly; to request a psychiatric report, and to
develop character evidence through the use of witnesses.- The
Court found no basis for the first four claims, but addressed the
claims of failure to request a psychiatric report and failure to
develop character evidence in light of the Sixth Amendment.26
20 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
" Id. at 699.
12 Id. at 689.
23 Id. at 687.
24 Id. at 671.
25 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 675.
26 Id. at 676.
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The Court held that a successful Sixth Amendment
claimant must show two elements - deficient performance by
defense counsel and sufficient prejudice caused by that defense
which clearly renders the verdict unreliable. Under the federal
standard, deficient performance requires that defense counsel's
errors are so material that the professional knowledge and skill
required to obtain just results under the Constitution are lacking.28
The standard of attorney performance is "reasonably effective
assistance," where the defendant must show that counsel was
incompetent in his or her decisions and the conduct was below an
objective standard of reasonableness, based on the totality of the
circumstances and measured under prevailing professional norms.29
The purpose of the Sixth Amendment, ensuring a defendant a fair
trial, is the benchmark for judging all ineffectiveness claims.3"
Under the second required element, sufficient prejudice, the
defendant must show that the purpose of the Sixth Amendment, to
ensure a fair trial and reliable result, is defeated by the deficient
performance.3 The appropriate test for prejudice is whether there
"is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors," the verdict would have been different.32
27 Id. at 687.
28 Id. at 685 ("Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of
counsel because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to the ability
of the adversarial system to produce just results.").
29 Id. at 687-88.
30 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
3 Id. at 687.
32 Id. at 694.
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In Strickland, the Court found that there was a strategic
choice involved in counsel's failure to argue mental instability and
that his choices were within reasonable professional judgment.33
Therefore, there was no reasonable probability that counsel's
errors unfairly affected the outcome. a4
The federal standard is less restrictive than the New York
standard because it allows measuring adequate legal assistance
against the "wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical
decisions."" The New York courts have incorporated a
"meaningful representation standard"36 where the defendant has the
burden of proving that counsel's actions constituted "egregious and
prejudicial conduct" which resulted in an unfair trial."
In People v. Baldi, the Court of Appeals of New York
applied the traditional standard requiring that the attorney's
conduct render "the trial a farce and a mockery of justice. '39 The
court evaluated the conduct of the attorney and found that his
strategy was one accepted by law and, therefore, did not offend
traditional notions of fairness.4  The defendant, Joseph Baldi,
charged with murder and burglary, claimed that his sanity had not
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that his counsel's
assistance was ineffective because he argued an insanity defense
33 Id. at 699.
14 Id. at 700.
31 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
36 People v. Benevento, 697 N.E.2d 584, 587 (N.Y. 1998).
37 Id. at 588.
3' 429 N.E.2d 408 (N.Y. 1981).
39 Id. at 405.40 Id. at 407.
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instead of innocence. The court found that the defense was
reasonable because Baldi had been found incompetent to stand
trial. " Since the defense was found to be well-grounded, even
though it was ultimately unsuccessful, the court rejected the
contention that a reversal of Baldi's conviction was warranted by
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim because the conduct of
his attorney was both reasonable and competent.42
In People v. Benevento,43 the Court of Appeals of New
York applied the Baldi test and held that absent "egregious and
prejudicial" error inducing an unreliable and unjust result,
meaningful representation was provided to the defendant.44
Benevento was convicted of second degree robbery and sentenced
to prison. 5 The Appellate Division, First Department reversed,
finding that Benevento was deprived of effective assistance of
counsel in a criminal proceeding.46 Benevento's claim was based
on his dissatisfaction with counsel's method of pleading lack of
intent as his defense.47 During the trial, defense counsel argued
that although the defendant admitted to the assault, he was too
intoxicated to form the requisite intent.4 He also argued, in
support of his strategy, that in light of the circumstances that
Benevento had two hundred dollars on him at the time of the
4 1 Id. at 405.
4 2 Id. at 408.
4' 697 N.E.2d at 584.44 Id. at 588.
45 Id. at 586.
46 Id. at 585.
47 Id. at 586.
48 Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 586.
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alleged robbery, he had no rational motive to steal fifteen dollars
from the victim. 49  On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed,
finding that counsel presented a well-established and viable
defense in response to the evidence at trial."
The court reasoned that "[t]o prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance, defendants must demonstrate that they were
deprived of a fair trial by less than meaningful representation; a
simple disagreement with strategies, tactics, or the scope of
possible cross-examination, weighed long after the trial, does not
suffice.... .'" Applying the reasonableness standard set forth in
Baldi, the court reiterated that "meaningful representation" does
not mean "perfect representation."52 The stringent nature of this
standard requires a defendant to prove that he or she was provided
less than reasonable assistance of counsel.
The New York standard is higher and the burden is
substantially heavier than the federal standard because in New
York the defendant must prove both that defense counsel's efforts
had no rational connection to a "reasonable and legitimate
strategy"" and that he or she was objectively incompetent to serve
49 Id. at 586.
'0 Id. at 585.
" Id. at 587.
52 Id.
53See, e.g., People v. Tonge, 710 N.E.2d 653 (N.Y. 1999) (holding that defense
counsel's failure to object to improper remarks made by the prosecutor during
summation reflected a reasonable and legitimate strategy under the
circumstances and evidence presented); People v. Ryan, 682 N.E.2d 977 (N.Y.
1997) (holding that the defendant failed to establish an ineffectiveness claim
because the actions of the defense counsel could be attributed to tactical trial
decisions); People v. Rivera, 525 N.E.2d 698 (N.Y. 1988) (holding that
counsel's failure to seek a pretrial hearing does not, by itself, establish
2004]
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the client's best interests. Both standards focus on the right to a
fair trial and a reliable verdict, but fairness is measured against
different standards - the federal standard is a reasonableness
standard where the defendant must prove that the conduct was not
within his reasonable expectations, and, in New York, a
reasonableness standard where almost any conduct will be
considered legitimate unless clearly "egregious and prejudicial."54
Furthermore, in New York the court must examine whether
counsel's errors "were so prejudicial" that they deprived the
defendant of a fair trial,55 whereas the federal standard examines
prejudicial effect in terms of the professionalism of counsel's
actions where there must be "a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. 56
Susan Persaud
ineffective assistance of counsel because it can be attributed to many other
things).54 Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 588.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 587-88 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
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